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ANATOMY OF A FAILED PRISON YARD INTEGRATION - Page 2by Lt. John Kavanaugh, CSP-CorcoranINTEGRATION PROPOSAL AND PROCEDURES On May 10, 2006, a proposed action plan was approved by the associate warden, housing, and submitted to Derrel G. Adams, warden, Corcoran, concerning the integration of Level IV Southern Hispanic inmates from Facility 3B to Facility 3A. Subsequently, about 25 additional Southern Hispanic inmates were received from CSATF to CSP-Corcoran's Facility 3B in anticipation of the integration of Facility 3A (this, to achieve an eventual equal balance of Southern Hispanics with the 90 Fresno Bulldog inmates on Facility 3A). On Sept. 6, 2006, Warden Adams approved an Initial Plan of Operations, which directed that Facility 3A be placed on a modified program in preparation for the integration of Southern Hispanic inmates from Facility 3B to Facility 3A. A schedule was prepared to advise all supervisors of the planned schedule to prepare for the integration of the Southern Hispanics. Central files of the affected inmates were screened and searches of the inmates' properties were conducted. Sept. 13, 2006, was the target date for the start of the actual integration. Interviews with influential Facility 3A Fresno Bulldog inmates revealed they would be unable to program on the same facility as the Southern Hispanics; the consensus being that there has been too much bad blood between the two groups. INTEGRATION PROCESS Status Update memorandums were generated, schedule of searches went into effect, and the planned integration of the Southern Hispanics onto Facility 3A went into full swing on September 6. The entire area of Facility 3A was searched for weapons. The Central Files of the inmates scheduled to move were screened for any specific enemy concerns. Approximately 100 Southern Hispanic inmates were relocated from Facility 3B to Facility 3A. During this time the normal programming of Facility 3A was in disarray; only critical workers were allowed to the job sites. No recreational out-of-cell time was allowed for the inmates. The Oct. 10, 2006, Action Plan Update provided an intricate plan designed to ensure the utmost level of safety for all inmates released to yard. This plan was closely followed. After weeks of speculation, planning, and preparation, the institution announced the impending yard integration. On the morning of Thursday, Oct. 12, 2006, seven Bulldog and seven Southern Hispanic inmates were released to the Facility 3A east yard (additional general population inmates were also released to the yard). The institution's Investigative Services Unit staff members were present on the facility with a camera, prepared to watch the show. Within minutes of the release of the inmates to the yard, the 14 inmates initiated a riot in which they savagely attacked each other. Facility officers utilized chemical agents to stop the riot. The inmates were removed from the yard and provided medical attention. The 14 rioters were treated for various abrasions, scratches, and slashes. One inmate suffered stab wounds. One Plexiglas weapon was discovered in the riot area. The administrators initially directed the incident commander to return the 14 involved inmates to their housing units and charge them with mutual combat. Fortunately, common sense prevailed; the 14 inmates were subsequently segregated from the general population and charged with violations of the California Code of Regulations, Title 15, for the specific acts of participation in a riot. Although the Fresno Bulldog and Southern Hispanic inmates were both equally culpable for their individual actions during the riot, Corcoran administrators directed the RVR's for the Southern Hispanics be mitigated to mutual combat, and that the Fresno Bulldogs receive SHU terms for their conduct. REVIEW CSP-Corcoran, Facility 3A, has been known for years as a soft Level IV facility, one of the few 270 degree design prison facilities where general population inmates, regardless of their gang affiliations or commitment offenses, have typically programmed safely. The integration of the Southern Hispanics onto Facility 3A has wrecked the established ecology of the facility. The integration process and the Oct. 12, 2006, riot between the Fresno Bulldog and the Southern Hispanic inmates has caused a disruption to institutional services and an undue diversion of valuable staff resources. Racial tensions have now heightened between black inmates and the Southern Hispanics due to the black inmates' long-standing harmony with the Fresno Bulldogs on Facility 3A. A number of the Mexican National inmates have now taken a militant form; they are in turmoil over their division of loyalties to the Southern Hispanics. In early 2006, Facility 3B had undergone a mission change from a Level IV facility to a Level III facility. The administration was still faced with the dilemma of locating housing for the remaining Level IV Southern Hispanic inmates; these inmates were simply moved to Facility 3A, rather than transferred to appropriate housing elsewhere in the state. It should be noted that Facility 2A line officers and supervisors had advised CSP-Corcoran administrators of the violence that would occur, and of the disruption to institutional programs should the integration take place. Although no written reason from the administration is provided, a recent Supreme Court ruling (Garrison S. Johnson vs. California et al, No. 03-636) was alluded to as the administration's reason for the integration. Based upon this ruling, the Department has now formulated an Integrated Housing Program with which to racially integrate eligible offenders. Review of the court case reveals a ruling concerning inmates' racial desegregation of institution cells, not the integration of known enemy factions together onto a prison yard. The CSP-Corcoran administrators knew of the potential for violence and the necessary subsequent use of force by correctional officers to stop the violence that would occur once the 100 Southern Hispanic inmates were introduced onto Facility 3A. As suspected, the placement of the Southern Hispanic inmates onto Facility 3A created violence, and, along with it, the use of force by custody staff to stop the violence. This integration only smacks of a staged gladiator fight with which to entertain the administrators. Continue Reading: Page 1 | Page 2  Print This PageBack to Volume 24, Issue 1 Back to PEACEKeeper Main Page |
